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1. Introduction 
Reserve-bipolar Li/SOC12 batteries are preferred for mili- 
tary applications which require: 
o Prolonged uncontrolled storage. In the reserve mode the 
storability of a Li/SOC12 battery is essentially indef- 
ini te. 
o Safety prior to use. As the two active battery materials 
are stored in separate hermetic containers there is no 
possibility of a hazardous runaway reaction. It should be 
noted that this is not necessarily the case for reserve 
batteries employing solid anode and cathode materials. 
o Very high specific power levels due to the bipolar design 
and the liquid catholyte. 
This paper describes the design, performance and safety of a 
fully engineered, self-contained Li/SOC12 battery as the 
power source for an underwater Navy application. In addition 
to meeting the performance standards of the end user this 
battery has been successfully tested under the rigorous' 
safety conditions of NAVSEA Instruction 9310.1A for use on 
land, aircraft and surface ships. 
2. Battery Design and Performance 
A schematic cross section of the battery is given in Figure 
1. Prior to activation the catholyte and dry battery stack 
are separated by a burst disk in the central bulkhead. The 
stack itself consists of ten 25 cell series modules, During 
construction the dry stack is potted in epoxy with individual 
bus wires running down the outer surface of the epoxy shell. 
The bus wires run to a terminal board at the base of the bat- 
tery. The individual modules are connected in parallel to 
yield the required capacity and voltage upon activation. Per 
NAVSEA Instruction 9310.1A the modules are connected through 
protective diodes to prevent charging. In addition each 
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module is protected from short circuit by fusing both the 
negative and positive bus wires. 
Undersea activation of the battery occurs when water pressure 
bursts the disk above the piston and a bursting pressure is 
transmitted to the disk between the reservoir and the dry 
stack. As the device sinks increasing hydrostatic pressure 
fills the battery stack with electrolyte. 
In its intended application the battery is required to pro- 
vide hotel power and multi-kilowatt pulse power. A typical 
discharge curve for the battery is given in Figure 2. The 
total energy drained from the battery corresponds to 850 Wh. 
The complete battery measures 29.5 cm in length, 12.7 cm in 
diameter and weighs 11.4 kg. This yields energy densities of 
0230 Wh/l and 75 Wh/kg. The gravemetric energy density is 
strongly influenced by the heavy case (60% of the battery 
weight) required for deep undersea operation, 
3. Safety 
Operational Safety: The battery is intended for operation in 
unmanned devices and hence safety of activated batteries dur- 
ing discharge is not an issue. It is an issue during devel- 
opment and if device recovery is contemplated. 
During preliminary development of the battery venting after 
discharge but prior to full energy depletion (approximately 
24 hrs) was observed approximately 50% of time. The source 
of these vents was identified as the growth of lithium den- 
drites driven by the leakage currents in the common electro- 
lyte bipolar filling manifold. 
The solution to this problem was to clear the manifold of 
electrolyte after battery activation. This is accomplished 
by partially filling the reservoir with argon. Once the bat- 
tery is filled the electrolyte bursts a rupture disk between 
the stack and an overflow reservoir. Upon rupture of this 
disk the piston forces electrolyte out and argon into the 
filling manifold. By clearing the manifold leakage currents 
are virtually eliminated and no dendritic ventings have been 
observed in six consecutive tests. 
Short Circuit Safety: By design the battery is fused to 
assure complete safety durinq short circuit. This is com- 
bined with- internal depletion resistors to fully deactivate 
the battery prior to retrieval. 
Nonetheless, NAVSEA Instruction 931 0 .'lA calls for short cir- 
cuit tests with all fuses and diodes removed. This test was 
carried out at the systems level by heating the electrolyte 
reservoir of a shorted battery. 
After 26 minutes of heating the reservoir temperature reached 
230°C and the battery activated. The behavior of the battery 
after activation is depicted in Figure 3. To summarize, 54 
seconds after activation there was a mild vent with no vis- 
ible movement of the system. The maximum temperature reached 
was 5 0 6 " ~  10 minutes and 15 seconds after activation. Maxi- 
mum short circuit current was 42 amps and a 10 psig pressure 
spike was observed above the battery vent. The battery 
presented no fire or explosive hazards. 
Reserve Safety: The two areas of concern for an unactivated 
battery are: 
o Maintenance of reserve integrity during shock and vibra- 
t ion 
o Safety during a conflagration test 
Batteries of an early design passed vibration testing but 
failed shock by rupture of the electrolyte burst disk when 
subjected to 330g for 1 msec. A failure analysis led to the 
conclusion that this resulted from mixing of the argon with 
the electrolyte and the development of stress concentrations 
at the disk. 
The solution was to place the baffle shown in Figure 1 
between the bulk of the reservoir and the burst disk. With 
the baffle design the batteries are capable of: 
o Passing both shock and vibration 
o Delivery of full capacity after both shock and vibration 
o A 3.8 to 1 safety margin in the shock test 
Conflagration tests in accordance with NAVSEA Instruction 
9310.1A have been carried out at the systems level. Accept- 
ance, while subjective is generally deemed as the absence of 
any fragmentation or flame. 
An extensive testing, analysis and design program was imple- 
mented to meet this standard. Specific activities have 
included : 
o Analytical calculation of reaction rates and battery 
internal pressure. 
o Structural analysis of the battery casing and design as 
required to assure its integrity in a worst case 
situation. 
o Introduction of a nonfragmentary burst disk. 
Results of the reaction time-pressure analysis are summarized 
in Figure 4. The analysis showed reaction times of: 
200 msec worst case 
500 msec best estimate 
1000 msec best case 
Based on' this analysis the bulkhead between the reservoir and 
the stack was designed to accomodate the worst case reaction 
time. In Figure 4 results of experimental verification of 
the case integrity are given. 
The safety vent was changed to a nonfragmentary design with 
an increased rim thickness to assure weld integrity. This 
redesign was accompanied by modification of the vent hole 
pattern in the piston as shown in Figure 5. The new design 
eliminates excessive pressure at the center of the safety 
disk and reduces the blow torch phenomena typical of bipolar 
batteries venting up the fill hole. 
The result of this through analysis and design to conflagra- 
tion safety standards is graphically demonstrated in Figure 
6. Although the system shows the effects of conflagration no 
fragmentation has occured and no flame was emitted during the 
test. 
4. Conclusions 
The Li/SOC12 system has potentially the highest energy and 
power density of any primary power source. Concerns with 
regard to battery safety increase with both energy and power 
density. 
Development of the battery described in this report demon- 
strates that with careful engineering safe-reserve-bipolar 
Li/SOC12 are achievable. 
To our knowledge this is the first reserve Li/SOC12 battery 
to have complied with the standards in NAVSEA Instruction 
9310.1A. The lessons learned in this program are presently 
being applied at Altus to the development of larger, higher 
energy density batteries. 
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THEORETICAL PRESSURES 
REACTION 
TIME (SECS) 
TEST PRESSURES 
*Lost pressure 
**Battery top failed 
(PSI) P2 (PSI) 
1345 1088 
2588 2058 
3508 2720 
4347 3579 
Figure  4. Ba t t e ry  p r e s s u r e  tes t .  

F i g u r e  6 .  System l e v e l  b a t t e r y  c o n f l a g r a t i o n  test. 
